Voices From Iraq 2007: Ebbing Hope in a Landscape of Loss

Seventy-one percent report three or all four of these. Twenty-two percent -- one in five Iraqi adults -- experience three or four of them "a great deal" of the time. Multiple signs of stress, as well as severity, commonly are used in assessing risk of stress disorder.

Outside relatively peaceful Kurdistan, the violence, and the stress, soar. Experience of a "great deal" of stress spikes among people in troubled, Sunni-dominated Anbar province, Sunni Arabs overall, Baghdad residents and big-city residents overall.

Other areas are hardly violence-free. This poll asked about nine kinds of violence (car bombs, snipers or crossfire, kidnappings, fighting among opposing groups or abuse of civilians by various armed forces). Essentially everyone in Baghdad says at least one of these has occurred nearby; half report four or more of them. But outside Baghdad, 74 percent also report at least one of these, and 25 percent report four or more -- 34 percent excluding Kurdistan, which is far more peaceful than the country overall.

As noted above, 53 percent of Iraqis say a close friend or immediate family member has been hurt in the current violence. That ranges from three in 10 in the Kurdish provinces to, in Baghdad, nearly eight in 10. (The size of extended families in Iraq likely contributes to the breadth of this result.)

Overall, eight in 10 Iraqis say they've become "more wary or watchful." Nearly seven in 10 are careful in what they say about themselves to other people. Vast numbers say they routinely limit their movements, avoiding travel, avoiding markets and crowded places and above all, avoiding U.S. and coalition forces. These avoidance techniques are most prevalent in Baghdad, but are common elsewhere as well.

Among sectarian groups, the experience of nearby violence peaks among Sunni Arabs, who are much more likely, in particular, to report abuse by the authorities. It follows that Sunni Arabs also are more likely to exercise avoidance techniques -- and to feel anger about their situation.

THE AMERICANS -- The United States gets much of the blame. As noted, in the most troubling result from an American perspective, the number of Iraqis who call it "acceptable" to attack U.S. or coalition forces has soared from 17 percent in early 2004 to 51 percent now.

The main source of this antipathy is disaffected Sunni Arabs, the group that lost power with the overthrow of Saddam. Ninety-four percent of Sunni Arabs call attacks on U.S. forces acceptable. That compares with 35 percent of newly empowered Shiites (still a large number to endorse violence), vs. 7 percent of Kurds, who are far more favorably inclined toward the United States.

Even among Shiites, eight in 10 disapprove of the way the United States and other coalition forces have carried out their responsibilities in Iraq. More than eight in 10 Shiites (as well as 97 percent of Sunni Arabs) oppose the presence of U.S. and other forces in their country. (Kurds, again, differ powerfully; 75 percent support the U.S. presence.) More than seven in 10 Shiites -- and nearly all Sunni Arabs -- think the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is making security worse.

Asked whom they blame most for the current violence in Iraq, far and away the most common answer -- voiced by four in 10 Iraqis -- is either U.S. and coalition forces (31 percent), or George W. Bush personally (nine percent). Al Qaeda and foreign jihadi fighters are cited by 18 percent (far more by Shiites and Kurds than by Sunnis).

Indeed, among the occurrences of local violence measured in this poll, the top mention is "unnecessary violence against citizens by U.S. or coalition forces." Forty-four percent of Iraqis -- including 60 percent of Sunni Arabs -- report this as having occurred nearby.

In another sign of finger-pointing -- and perhaps an expression of helplessness -- 59 percent of Iraqis say they think the United States controls things in Iraq. Fewer than half as many said so in 2005, 24 percent.

Worsening views of U.S. and other forces in Iraq tracks the deterioration of conditions in the country. In the first ABC News poll in Iraq, in February 2004, 51 percent of Iraqis opposed the presence of U.S. forces on their soil. By November 2005 that jumped to 65 percent. Today, it's 78 percent.

But how to proceed is complicated. Even as they express discontent with U.S. forces, Iraqis are equivocal about their departure -- a reasonable compunction, given the uncertainty of what might follow. Just over a third (35 percent) favor immediate U.S. withdrawal, peaking at 55 percent of Sunni Arabs -- fewer than might be expected given this group's nearly unanimous anti-Americanism. About four in 10 -- Sunni and Shiite alike -- say U.S. forces should remain until security is restored.

"Leave now" sentiment is up, but not vastly, from 2005 -- 26 percent then, vs., again, 35 percent now.

SURGE and RECONSTRUCTION -- Adding forces, in any case, is not seen as a solution. Fewer than three in 10 Iraqis think sending additional U.S. troops to Baghdad and Anbar -- the Bush "surge" -- will improve security in these areas. Among Baghdad residents themselves, 36 percent think the surge will help things. In Anbar, where the Sunni Arab opposition is rooted, essentially everyone thinks it will make security worse.

These views relate to the overall lack of confidence in U.S. forces: Eighty-two percent of Iraqis say they're not confident in U.S. and U.K. forces -- 88 percent of Shiites as well as 97 percent of Sunni Arabs. (That falls to one-third of generally pro-U.S. Kurds.)

Reconstruction is another complaint: Nationwide, 67 percent of Iraqis say postwar reconstruction efforts in their area have been ineffective or nonexistent. Sixty percent of Shiites say so; among Sunnis, it's 94 percent. (There's another huge difference in Iraqi Kurdistan, where 73 percent call reconstruction effective.)

Interestingly, for all the negative changes in attitudes and experience, one result has remained essentially stable: Iraqis still divide, now by 48-52 percent, over whether the United States was right or wrong to invade in spring 2003.

Here the sectarian divide is as sharp as ever. Seventy percent of Shiites and 83 percent of Kurds -- groups brutally suppressed by Saddam -- endorse the invasion. But among Sunni Arabs, protected and empowered during Saddam's 23-year reign, 98 percent say it was wrong.